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ABSTRACT
The aim of the paper is to test the impact of various 
potential causes of unofficial economy in new mem-
ber states (NMS). The hypothesis of the paper is that 
the most significant factors in NMS are the tax bur-
den and the overall institutional environment. Paper 
uses unofficial economy estimates based on MIMIC 
and exhaustiveness of national account approaches 
over a longer period. A panel data method is used in 
econometric models in which various indicators of 
the intensity of regulations, tax burden, institutional 
framework and labour market conditions are used as 
potential factors able to explain cross-country differ-







- New member states
- Croatia
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Mikulić D, Nagyszombaty A..  2013. Causes of the 
unofficial economy in new EU memeber states. Ekonomska istraživanja – Economic Research Special Is-
sue 2013
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I. INTRODUCTION        
The presence of an unofficial economy has a significant influence on the official economy, espe-
cially in terms of public finance and labor market developments. Theoretically, the unofficial econ-
omy has both direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are evidenced by the diminishing ability of 
the government to collect taxes from economic agents. On the other hand, indirect effects remain 
predominantly hidden due to the inability of official statistics to accurately measure the extent 
of economic activity. Lack of exhaustiveness in national accounts estimates results in distortions 
in international comparisons of macroeconomic indicators. Additionally, in circumstances where 
unofficial economy developments differ substantially from that of registered GDP, official figures 
on economic growth could provide misleading information for analysts and policy makers. 
In economic literature, various terms and definitions are used to describe the phenom-
enon of an unofficial economy. Various authors use alternative terms such as: informal economy, 
underground economy, black economy, undeclared, unreported and unregistered economy. Gen-
erally, most definitions agree that the unofficial economy comprises of all currently unregistered 
productive economic activities: market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or 
illegal, that escape detection in the official estimates of GDP (Smith 1994). This definition is used, 
e.g., by Feige (1989), Schneider (1994, 2003, 2005) and Frey and Pommerehne (1984). A broader 
definition, taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno and Schneider (2003) and Feige (1989), is: …
those economic activities and the income derived from them that circumvent or otherwise avoid 
government regulation, taxation or observation. For other definition see also Thomas (1999) or 
Feld and Larsen (2005).
Aim of this paper is to identify the most important causes of unofficial economy (UE) in 
new member states (NMS), including Croatia which became an EU member in 2013. The struc-
ture of this paper is as follows. Following the introductory remarks, the first section of the paper 
brings a short literature review on the causes of the unofficial economy. In the second section of 
the paper, an estimate of the unofficial economy is presented for new member states. The third 
section identifies the main causes of informal economy dynamics in new member states. The last 
section concludes.
II. CAUSES OF THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY
In economic literature, tax burden is usually identified as the main factor influencing the develop-
ment of an unofficial economy. In an attempt to increase their income, economic agents could 
decide to hide a proportion of revenues in order to avoid the payment of taxes. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) examined some static and dynamic aspects of the decision to evade income taxes 
and found that tax compliance depends on the expected benefits (which are related to marginal 
tax rate) while costs are derived from the deterrence enacted by the government. Activation of 
economic units in an unofficial economy thus depends on the auditing activities of tax authorities, 
the probability of detection and fines for tax evasion determined by the government. If individu-
als expect that income generated in the unofficial sector by tax evasion is higher than potential 
fines they could make a decision to engage in UE and vice versa. Higher tax rates are thus directly 
related to the motivation of the entrepreneurs to truly report a proportion of their income.
Apart from taxation, some authors point to the relation between developments and 
trends in the official economy. In the upward phase of an economic cycle, economic units are usu-
ally more satisfied with rising income from official sources and more concerned with the potential 
risks of fines related to tax evasion. On the other hand, in the recession period, falling demand has 
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a direct negative impact not only on the official but also on the unofficial economy and entrepre-
neurs should choose to engage in the unofficial sector in an attempt to retain the income level 
held on previous levels. The increases in the unofficial economy can also be explained by other 
determinants related to various indicators of socio-economic development. 
Theoretical causes of the shadow economy according to the relevant literature (Frey and 
Pommerehne, 1984; Feld, 2010, Schneider and Enste, 2000) can be classified as:
a) Burdens on the official economy;
b) Public sector services;
c) Tax morality and government controls;
d) Labour market conditions;
e) Structural factors.
All of above factors have an impact on the relation between the informal and informal 
economy. If the tax burden is rising, we can expect a rising share of the unofficial economy. The 
higher the difference between the total cost of labour in the official economy and after-tax earn-
ings from work, the greater is the incentive to work in the unofficial economy. Empirical evidence 
on the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy is provided by Schneider (1994, 2005), 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998) and Feld (2010). Besides an obvious impact on the 
disposable income of an economic unit in the case of tax evasion, taxation level affects labour and 
leisure preferences.
An increase of the unofficial economy can lead to reduced public revenues from taxes 
which in turn reduces the quality and quantity of public goods and services. Ultimately, this can 
lead to an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, quite often com-
bined with deterioration in the quality of the public sector and of the overall government admin-
istration, leading to an even stronger incentive to participate in the shadow economy (Feld and 
Schneider, 2010).
A lower tax morality leads to an increased readiness to become active in the hidden econ-
omy. According to some empirical research there is no unique answer on the causality of the 
relation between tax morale and unofficial economy. Some surveys point to the conclusion that 
societies with lower levels of tax morality usually record higher levels of informal economy. On 
the other hand, an increase in the unofficial economy can be the factor behind lower quality of 
public services with a negative impact on tax morale. Feld and Frey (2007) argue that tax compli-
ance is driven by a psychological tax contract that entails rights and obligations from taxpayers 
and government authorities. Taxpayers are more inclined to pay their taxes if they consider public 
services as a satisfactory compensation in return for tax payment. Torgler and Schneider (2007) 
found that improving social institutions, by enhancing tax morale, the rule of the law, government 
effectiveness and quality of regulation, as well as reduction of corruption usually results in reduc-
tion of unofficial economy. They pointed to the legal structure and property rights as important 
determinants of the size of unofficial economy. Some authors found significant impact of various 
historical and geographic features of the countries and their influence on the institutional and 
political environment and consequently unofficial economy.
A growing intensity of public controls and higher fines reduce the return on hidden activities and 
therefore has the opposite effect according to Frey and Pommerehne (1984). Johnson, Kaufmann, 
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and Shleifer (1997) predict that ceteris paribus countries with higher general regulation of their 
economies tend to have a higher share of the unofficial economy in total GDP. Underground econ-
omy is also very often closely linked to corruption (Lovrinčević, Mikulić, Budak 2006).
If labor market conditions are improving in terms of higher labour demand in official sec-
tors, individuals have a stronger negotiation position and demand to be included in social security 
schemes from employers. If labour demand is weak, individuals are more concentrated on short-
term perspective (current income) and neglect the loss of potential social benefits in the future. 
Additionally, the longer official working time implies higher opportunity costs of taking up ad-
ditional work in the hidden economy. Unemployment benefits also influence readiness of work-
ers to participate in the official economy. If the wage of illicit work and the financial aid together 
yield more income than regular and overtime work (taking also into account the costs of detec-
tion and punishment and assuming risk neutrality) full-time illicit work as an unemployed person 
yields ceteris paribus a higher utility (Enste and Schneider 2002). Dell’Anno and Solomon (2006) 
evaluated a structural relationship between unofficial economy and the unemployment rate in 
the United States. They found a significant positive relationship between the unofficial economy 
and unemployment and concluded that this relationship could help to explain the connection 
between changes in the unemployment rate and output growth. A downturn in the economic 
official activities leads to a loss of jobs and thus drives part of unemployed persons to participate 
in the unofficial economy and because of that Okun’s law is biased. 
The determinants listed so far do not apply to all economies and even all economic sectors 
in the same way. Rather, there are certain industries (particularly those with low capital intensity) 
in which a higher probability of work in the hidden economy can be assumed. If a shift in demand 
increases a relative share of those industries, an overall increase in the share of unofficial economy 
is expected. Table 1 presents influence on the unofficial economy and relative importance of vari-
ous determinants. Empirical researches in most cases find tax burden as the most important de-
terminant of unofficial economy, followed by tax morale and quality of state institutions.
TABLE 1 - FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE SHADOW ECONOMY ACCORDING TO RESULTS 
OF VARIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Factors influencing the shadow econ-
omy
Influence on the shadow economy (in %)
a b
Increase of the tax burden 35-38 45-52
Quality of state institutions 10-12 12-17
Transfers 5-7 7-9
Specific labour market regulation 7-9 7-9
Public sector services 5-7 7-9
Tax morale 22-25
a) Average values of 12 studies
b) Average values of empirical results of 22 studies.
Source: (Feld and Schneider, 2010).
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III. ESTIMATES OF THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY FOR NEW EU MEMBER STATES 
In this chapter two independent estimates of the size of unofficial economy for new EU member 
states are presented. Aim of this comparison is to determine a possible range of UE and to see 
whether different methods based on various assumptions have, to an extent, similar patterns. We 
compare the results from two studies which comprise the broadest set of economies over a longer 
period - MIMIC approach and the exhaustiveness of national accounts approach. 
A. Estimates based on MIMIC approach
The main idea behind the MIMIC approach is to determine the relationship between an unob-
servable variable (unofficial economy), and a set of indicators related to UE which are available 
in a standard statistical system. In particular, the MIMIC model compares a sample covariance 
matrix, i.e. the covariance matrix of observable variables, with the parametric structure imposed 
by a hypothesized mode (Buehn, Schneider, 2012; Schenider 2012). For this purpose, the unofficial 
economy is related to the selected indicator variables in a factor analytical model. The relation-
ships between the unobservable variable and the observable explanatory (causal) variables or 
determinants are specified through a structural model.
In the MIMIC approach there are various factors determining the relative significance 
of the unofficial economy and its relation to the official economy. List of observable indicators 
which “cause” UE according to the theoretical papers are described in the following studies: Frey 
and Pommerehne, 1984; Feld, 2010, Schneider and Enste, 2000; Buehn, Schneider, 2012; Schenider 
2012. Despite the wide use of the MIMIC approach, there are some criticisms of the method, es-
pecially relating to data transformation, sensitivity to changes of measurement units, the possible 
dominance of a single causal variable and arbitrary benchmarking (Klarić, 2011).
In this paper we used UE estimates from most recent studies applying the MIMIC ap-
proach: Schneider (2012) and Buehn, Schneider (2012). Determinants used as possible causes of 
unofficial economy in these studies were the following: size of government, share of direct taxa-
tion, fiscal freedom, business freedom, unemployment rate, government effectiveness and sub-
national government employment. In their model, authors used the following variables as possible 
indicators of the size of UE: currency in circulation, labour force participation rate and GDP per 
capita. They found that the variables capturing the burden of taxation (in a wide sense), i.e. the 
size of government and fiscal freedom, unemployment rate and business freedom have the ex-
pected signs and are statistically significant. Indicator variables - the labour force participation rate 
and GDP per capita are also found to be statistically significant and showing the expected signs. 
Results of their estimates are presented in Table 2. Estimated unofficial economy size is 
higher in new member states, an expected result since NMS are lacking behind old EU countries 
not only in terms of economic development but also regarding overall institutional environment. 
In both subsamples (NMS and OECD-EU countries) one can notice a decreasing trend in unof-
ficial economy in the 2000-2008 period. Impact of recession is slightly different. While unofficial 
economy in old EU member countries on average increased in 2009, majority of new member 
states recorded a growth of unofficial economy in 2009 and slight increase in 2010. From the 
group of presented economies, the highest share of unofficial economy is estimated in Bulgaria 
and Romania.
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TABLE 2 - ESTIMATES OF THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY BASED ON MIMIC APPROACH IN 
STUDIES BUEHN, SCHNEIDER (2012) AND SCHENIDER (2012)
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NMS* 28.6 28.3 28.0 27.7 27.4 26.9 26.4 25.7 25.3 25.3 25.2
Bulgaria 36.9 36.6 36.1 35.6 34.9 34.1 33.5 33 33.7 32.1 31.9
Czech Republic 19.1 18.9 18.8 18.7 18.4 17.8 17.3 16.3 15.2 15.7 15.4
Estonia 32.7 32.4 32.0 30.7 30.8 30.2 29.6 29.5 29 29.6 29.3
Hungary 25.1 24.8 24.5 24.4 24.1 24 23.7 23.7 23.1 23.1 23.1
Latvia 30.5 30.1 29.8 30.4 30 29.5 29 27.5 26.5 27.1 27.3
Lithuania 33.7 33.3 32.8 32 31.7 31.1 30.6 29.7 29.1 29.6 29.7
Poland 27.6 27.7 27.7 27.5 27.3 26.9 26.4 25.4 24.7 24.6 23.8
Romania 34.4 33.7 33.5 32.8 32 31.7 30.7 30.8 31.5 30 30.9
Slovenia 27.1 26.7 26.6 26.7 26.5 26 25.8 24.7 24 24.6 24.3
Slovakia 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.4 18.2 17.6 17.3 16.8 16 16.8 16.4
OECD-EU* 18.6 18.4 18.4 18.5 18.4 18.4 18.2 18 18 18.5 18.5
Austria 9.8 9.7 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.6 9.7 9.5 9.7 10.6
Belgium 22.2 22.1 22 22 21.8 21.8 21.4 20.8 20.3 20.5 20.7
Ireland 15.9 15.9 15.9 16 15.8 15.6 15.5 15.4 15.9 17.5 16.5
Italy 27.1 26.7 26.8 27 27 27.1 26.9 26.8 26.7 26.5 26.7
Netherlands 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.1 12.7 12.9 13.6
Spain 22.7 22.4 22.4 22.4 22.5 22.4 22.4 22.3 22.9 24.5 23.5
Sweden 19.2 19.1 19 18.7 18.5 18.6 18.2 18 17.7 17.9 18.1
Croatia 33.4 33.2 32.6 32.1 31.7 31.3 30.8 30.4 29.6 30.1 29.8
*unweighted average
Source: Buehn, Schneider (2012) and Schenider (2012)
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B. Estimate of non-exhaustiveness of national accounts based on Eurostat approach
In order to ensure the comparability of national accounts in member states, Eurostat developed 
an appropriate methodology to estimate the size of UE - Eurostat‘s Tabular Approach to Exhaus-
tiveness. This approach provides a framework for the estimate of the UE that is particularly well 
suited for transition countries. 
According to this approach, a detailed study of national accounts methodology and sta-
tistical data sources should be done in order to indentify different types of non-exhaustiveness. 
All types of non-exhaustiveness are systematically covered and are mutually excluded. The main 
advantage of this method comes from the possibility of a comparison of different types of non-
exhaustiveness adjustments by countries. In general, this method gives the most conservative es-
timates of the UE size. The classification of non-exhaustiveness types in the national accounts is 
based on various characteristics of the producer, i.e. the way in which data is obtained from pro-
ducers. The methodological issues and classification of non-exhaustiveness types in the national 
accounts is elaborated in Eurostat (2005). Croatian methodology and results were presented in 
Lovrinčević, Mikulić, Galić Nagyszombaty (2011).  According to this method, following types of 
UE exists:
•	 N1 Producer should have registered (underground producer)
•	 N2 Illegal producer that fails to register
•	 N3 Producer is not obliged to register 
•	 N4 Registered legal person is not included in statistics 
•	 N5 Registered entrepreneur is not included in statistics
•	 N6 Misreporting by the producer 
•	 N7 Statistical deficiencies in the data
According to the definition, some of non-exhaustiveness types primarily related to the 
lack of statistical coverage (N3-N5 and N7). Deliberate misreporting because of tax evasion cov-
ers types N1, N2 and N6. Unfortunately, methodology and data for all countries are not publicly 
available in detail and in this empirical study, an estimate for total non-exhaustiveness is used only. 
In this chapter, a comparison of UE estimates is presented for new member states except 
Malta and Cyprus (data based on the Eurostat approach not available). MIMIC approach as pre-
sented by Buehn, Schneider (2012) on average resulted in significantly higher estimates in com-
parison to the Eurostat non-exhaustiveness (NOE) project aimed on inclusion of UE in official 
national accounts. As can be seen from Table 3, unweighted average for NOE adjustment in new 
member states was 12% of GDP which is almost double in comparison to old member states (data 
are available for OECD countries). Buehn and Schneider (2012) based on MIMIC approach found 
a significantly higher share of unofficial economy in NMS. Their estimate is on average 2.4 times 
higher than NOE adjustment for NMS. In the subset of old member states the same indicator is 
6.4 with a significant dispersion among countries. For Croatia this ratio stands at 3.3 which is close 
to other NMS economies.
Although differences in results are relatively high, a certain degree of correlation between 
estimates based on MIMIC and Eurostat approach can be noticed (Figure 1). We can divide NMS 
in two sets of countries. First set comprise Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Croatia and Bulgaria and 
the second Czech, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Lithuania. There is a clear pattern of strong cor-
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relations between NOE and MIMIC estimates within elements of the same group. On the other 
hand, MIMIC approach gives on average higher estimates for the first group (if exhaustiveness of 
national accounts is used as benchmark). For example, MIMIC approach estimates approximately 
the same level of unofficial economy in Estonia and Lithuania while according to Eurostat ap-
proach share of UE in Lithuania is almost double in comparison to Estonia. Slovakia is obviously 
outlier and cannot be classified in before mentioned groups. Either MIMIC estimates for Slovakia 
are underestimated or NOE results overestimate the level of Slovakian unofficial economy. 
TABLE 3 - COMPARISON OF UE ESTIMATES BASED ON EXHAUSTIVENESS OF NATIONAL  








Ratio Buehn, Schneider 
(2012) NOE
NMS 12.0 28.2 2.4
Bulgaria 2001 10.2 36.6 3.6
Czech Republic 2000 7.7 19.1 2.5
Estonia 2002 9.6 32.0 3.3
Hungary 2000 11.9 25.1 2.1
Latvia 2000 14.4 29.8 2.1
Lithuania 2002 18.9 32.8 1.7
Poland 2002 7.8 27.7 3.6
Romania 2002 17.7 33.5 1.9
Slovenia 2002 6.9 26.6 3.9
Slovakia 2002 14.6 18.6 1.3
OECD-EU 6,2 18,6 6,4
Austria 2001 7,9 9,7 1,2
Belgium 2002 3,0 22,0 7,3
Ireland 1998 4,0 16,1 4,0
Italy 2003 14,8 27,0 1,8
Netherlands 1995 1,0 13,3 13,3
Spain 2000 11,2 22,7 2,0
Sweden 2000 1,3 19,2 14,8
Croatia 2000 10,1 33,4 3,3
*unweighted average.
Source: Buehn, Schneider (2012) and Schneider (2012), statistical offices of included countries, Quintano and Mazzocchi 
(2010).
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More detailed data, differentiated according to the types of non-exhaustiveness for each econo-
my are not available. It would be interesting to investigate the correlation between UE based on 
MIMIC approach and various types of non-exhaustiveness of national accounts, especially types 
N1 and N6 which are related to misreporting due to the tax evasion. 
CHART 1 - COMPARISON OF UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY ESTIMATES IN NEW MEMBER STATES 
(MIMIC AND NON-OBSERVED ECONOMY ESTIMATED BY EUROSTAT APPROACH)
Source: Buehn, Schneider (2012) and Schneider (2012), statistical offices of included countries, Quintano and Mazzocchi 
(2010).
IV. EMPIRICAL MODELLING OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE UNOFFICIAL ECON-
OMY IN NMS
In the paper we tested two sets of unofficial economy estimates which cover the longest period for 
new member states– exhaustiveness of national accounts estimates and MIMIC approach (Buehn 
and Schneider, 2012).The empirical analysis was based on the estimates of unofficial economy in 
period 2000-2011 with the new member states (including Croatia) as cross-section units and the 
panel data method was applied. Due to the fact that countries differ in size some estimation bias 
might occur. The basic equation estimated in the paper is the following: 
yi,t =α +βXi,t + ei,t                                                                 (1)
where y denotes a dependent variable (unofficial economy, and X a set of explanatory 
variables (t stands for period 2000-2011, while i = 1 to 11 denotes NMS). Panel data method with 
fixed effects was applied, and variables in each specification were pre-tested for multicolinearity. 
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The estimate of unofficial economy (expressed in terms of share in GDP) was treated as dependent 
variable and two different sets of estimates were used: MIMIC and exhaustiveness of national ac-
counts approach. Set of potential explanatory variables were selected based on findings presented 
in the literature review. Variables are classified in four different groups and their list and data 
sources are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 - POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY
Group of variables Variable Data source
Fiscal burden
Revenue, excluding grants (% of 
GDP)
Worldbank database
Social contributions (% of revenue) Worldbank database
Tax revenue (% of GDP) Worldbank database
Taxes on goods and services (% of 
revenue)
Worldbank database
Taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains (% of total taxes)
Worldbank database
Fiscal freedom Heritage foundation
Government spending Heritage foundation
Public sector services; Tax morality and 
government controls
Index of economic freedom Heritage foundation
Freedom from corruption Heritage foundation
Business freedom Heritage foundation
Corruption perception indeks Transparency international
Labour market condition
Unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force)
Worldbank database
Labour force participation Worldbank database
Structural  factors
GDP growth (annual %) Worldbank database
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $)
Worldbank database
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) Worldbank database
Industry, value added (% of GDP) Worldbank database
Services, etc., value added (% of 
GDP)
Worldbank database
Exports of goods and services (% 
of GDP)
Worldbank database
Imports of goods and services (% 
of GDP)
Worldbank database
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) Worldbank database
Source: Worldbank database, Transparency international, Heritage foundation.
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The scope of the variables included in the model are based on theoretical and empirical findings 
of other authors, as suggested in the literature review. Additionally, some preliminary control of 
multicolinearity between independent variables is made. 
When applying the panel data method, it is necessary to decide between the random ef-
fects and fixed effects specification. The procedure requires that both specifications are estimated. 
In the random effects specification model the number of cross-sections should be higher than the 
number of coefficients for a between estimator which impact the number of independent vari-
ables in the model. In order to test whether fixed effect specification is appropriate, the Hausman 
test was used. The hypothesis that random effects is preferred due to higher efficiency was not 
confirmed so fixed effects are used in both specification presented. 
The estimation results, including such a specification, are presented in Table 5 with sepa-
rate columns for unofficial economy based on MIMIC approach and for unofficial economy based 
on Eurostat approach. Various model specification using different sets of variables (Table 4) as 
possible explanatory variables is tested and we present only models with best econometric prop-
erties. Regarding structural factors, most of models found negative relations between openness 
(measured by share of export and import in GDP) and unofficial economy but parameters were 
no significant on the specified level and were not included in selected models. Some specification 
also point to positive relationship between importance of service sector and unofficial economy 
but estimated parameter is less significant.
TABLE 5 - CAUSES OF UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY IN NEW EU MEMBER STATES AND CROATIA 
Variable 
Dependant variable: UE esti-
mates based on MIMIC ap-
proach
Dependant variable: UE es-
timates based on Eurostat 
approach
Estimated parameters Estimated parameters
Constant 41.036***     (43.01) 5.34***     (2.94)
Government spending 0.02071 ***    (2.92) 0.196 ***    (3.98)
Index of economic freedom -0.1137***     (-5.67) 0.153***     (4.49)
GDP per capita -0.00041 ***    (-13.57) -0.00029 ***    (-5.41)
Freedom from corruption -0.031 **    (-2.21) -0.075 ***    (-3.12)
Adjusted R2 0.9896 0,933
Redundant cross section fixed effects 
LR test
F statistics (p-value)
386.28***  (0.000) 92.24***  (0,000)
Number of observation 132 132
Source: Author calculation 
a Triple asterisks mark coefficients significant at a level of 1%; double asterisks, at a level of 5%; single asterisks, at a level of 10%. In paren-
theses, t-values are given.
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Presented empirical results show correlations found in most previous studies. In both spec-
ifications, a high proportion of variation in unofficial economy can be explained by a presented set 
of independent variables. Government expenses, as broadest indicator of costs government posed 
to the official economic units, turned to be more significant than revenues in explaining pattern 
of the unofficial economy in new member states. Despite process of tax harmonisation process 
according to EU regulations in precession period, there are still significant differences in the struc-
ture of taxation in NMS. Government expenditures is actually a composite indicator of overall tax 
burden while variation in structure of tax revenues makes each individual tax type less significant 
in explaining UE trends in panel data specification.
We found significant parameter describing a negative relation between GDP per capita 
level and unofficial economy. More developed countries have recorded lower unofficial economy 
shares. Because of negative relationships, a conclusion that official and unofficial sector are substi-
tutes in new member states can be drawn. This is comparable to previous research. For example, 
Botrić, Marić and Mikulić (2004) found the negative correlation between the unofficial economy 
and the economic growth in transition economies.
Both models also identify corruption as a significant determinant of unofficial economy. 
Index of freedom from corruption based on Heritage foundation methodology is found to be 
significant in both estimated equations, where a negative relationship is found. As various studies 
suggest, lower levels of corruption strongly relate to other variables indicating overall institutional 
framework: quality of institutions and public services, tax morale and overall trust of citizens in 
government capacities and accountabilities. Besides lower level of tax burden, institutional im-
provements can explain significant part of unofficial economy dynamics in NMS. Those results are 
also in accordance with other studies which found that improving social institutions helps lessen a 
possible incentive to engage in UE sector (literature review on that matter can be found in Torgler 
and Schneider, 2007). Some previous studies point to the conclusion that at the macro level these 
variables can be jointly endogenous. High quality public institutions require commensurately large 
investments of public revenue raised by taxation while well-functioning institutions increase will-
ingness to pay taxes.
A variable which turned to be significant in both specifications, but with estimated oppo-
site signs of parameter was the Index of economic freedom (published by Heritage Foundation). 
Economic freedom index ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 is least economic freedom and 100 maxi-
mum economic freedom. According to theoretical background and previous studies, a negative 
relationship between economic freedom and unofficial economy is expected. In principle, higher 
level of regulation in economy relates to lower index of economic freedom. By activating in the 
informal sector, economic units can avoid some of regulations they found rigid for their activ-
ity. In the first model where MIMIC approach estimates of UE are treated as dependent variable 
negative signs were found, expectedly. On the other hand, in the second model, parameter for the 
same variable are estimated to be positive, meaning higher level of economic freedom is related 
to higher level of unofficial economy. Explanation for the unexpected sign can be the fact that 
Eurostat approach in total non-exhaustiveness of national accounts includes not only unofficial 
economy which is consequence of intentional misreporting because of tax avoidance purposes, 
but also comprises estimation of unrecorded activities which are result of a weak statistical sys-
tem. More complex reporting obligations of economic units for statistical purposes are negatively 
related to overall economic freedom but can reduce the extent of unrecorded activities due to 
statistical factors. On the other hand, counties with higher index of economic freedom might 
have less complex statistical requirements and because of that higher share of non-exhaustiveness 
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adjustment for statistical reasons.
V. CONCLUSION
The existence of an unofficial economy has a negative impact on the official economy, especially 
in terms of public finance and labour market developments. The exact size of unofficial economy 
cannot be exactly specified due to the nature of this phenomenon but there are different methods 
which could give a potential indicator of UE size. We compared estimation results for new member 
states based on MIMIC approach and Eurostat approach on exhaustiveness of national accounts. 
This paper identifies causes of unofficial economy in new EU member states and Croatia. 
Government expenditures as an overall indicator of tax burden turned to be significant in ex-
plaining the variation in the unofficial economy in NMS which is in line with majority of previous 
research. Because of differences in the structure of taxation, individual types of taxes turned to be 
less significant in explaining trends in the unofficial economy. A negative relationship between de-
velopment levels and the size of the unofficial economy is also found. Downturn in the economic 
official activities leads to a loss of jobs and thus drives part of unemployed into the shadow activi-
ties while during economic expansion it is much easier to realize economic goals in the official 
sector.
Models used in this paper do not give the unique answer on type of relationship between 
economic freedom and unofficial economy. In one specification we found expected relation-
ship in which higher level of economic freedom is related to lower level of unofficial economy. In 
model based on estimates of UE according to the results of exhaustiveness of national accounts 
approach, we found unexpected types of relationships. Explanation can be found in the meth-
odology of non-exhaustiveness of national accounts approach which combines adjustment for 
economic and statistical purposes.
According to our results, lower level of corruption can lead to the decreasing significance 
of the unofficial economy. Since various studies indicate that there is a strong relationship be-
tween corruption and other variables connected to overall institutional framework we can con-
clude that quality of institutions and public services, tax morale and overall trust of citizens in 
government capacities and accountabilities are also important factors of UE trends although not 
explicitly included in the presented model. 
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